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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK HATTON-WARD, an 
individual, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs . 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation, 
et al., 
Defendants-Petitioners, 
REPLY TO APPELLANT 
HATTON-WARD'S RESPONSE 
TO THE CITY'S PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Supreme Court 
No. 920194 
District Court 
No. 890906662CV 
Court of Appeals 
No. 910585-CA 
Pursuant to Rule 50(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the Petitioner, Salt Lake City Corporation, 
hereinafter referred to as the "City", submits this Reply Brief 
to Appellant Hatton-Ward's response to the City's Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WILL 
SIGNIFICANTLY BURDEN THE ABILITY OF STATE, 
COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL ELECTED OFFICIALS TO 
MANAGE THEIR WORKFORCE. 
In his response, Hatton-Ward states that the City merely 
"postulates" that the Court of Appeals' decision will have a far-
reaching impact on government employer-employee relations.L 
Hatton-Ward's narrow view of the decision's effect is based on 
the premise that the Whistle Blower Statute should be construed 
in a vacuum without regard to the other statutes and case law 
Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6. 
established by this Court.2 
For State, County and Municipal elected officials, the 
decision drastically changes the legal framework under which they 
must handle their personnel matters. 
First, the decision effectively nullifies the Civil Service 
statutes, which have been in existence since 1921,3 by allowing 
a discharged employee to ignore and circumvent the administrative 
review process simply by alleging "whistle blowing". 
Second, the decision is contrary to a long line of cases, 
decided by this Court/ which have held that the Civil Service 
Commission has initial jurisdiction over appeals by discharged 
Civil Service employees. 
Third, the Court of Appeals changes general rules of 
statutory construction affirmed by this Court in Murray City v. 
Hall.5 According to the decision, statutes will be construed 
literally even if: (1) such construction effectively nullifies 
other statutes; and (2) it is possible to construe them harmoniously. 
2Hatton-Ward, in his response, states that the Civil Service 
statutes were " . . . looked to by the Court of Appeals only as a 
comparison ..." Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 
3. 
3Vetterli v. Civil Service Commission of Salt Lake City, 145 
P.2d 794 (Utah 1944), Justice Larsen concurring. 
4Vetterli v. Civil Service Commission of Salt Lake City, 145 
P.2d 794 (Utah 1944); Piercey v. Civil Service Commission of Salt 
Lake City, 208 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1949); Erkman v. Civil Service 
Commission, 198 P.2d 238 (Utah 1948); Child v. Salt Lake City 
Civil Service Commission, 575 P.2d 195 (Utah 1978); Worrall v. 
Qgden City Fire Department, 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 1980). 
5663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983). 
2 
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Further, the conflict with well established case law developed by 
this Court was created by the Court of Appeals not the 
legislature. 
Due to the importance of this case to public employers and 
employees, this shift away from long established legal principles 
warrants further scrutiny and review. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE WHISTLE BLOWER ACT IS "LITERALLY" 
INTERPRETED, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE 
CONSTRUED THE STATUTE IN ITS ENTIRETY RATHER 
THAN APPLYING SELECTIVE PROVISIONS. 
If the Court of Appeals holds State, County and Municipal 
governments to the strict literal interpretation of the Whistle 
Blower Statute, it should have applied the entire statute. The 
Court of Appeals, however, did not even mention Section 67-21-3 
of the Act, yet, this is the provision of the Act which expresses 
a legislative intent favoring the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies doctrine. 
Section 67-21-3 of the Whistle Blower Act states that: 
. . . An employer shall not discharge . . . or 
otherwise bring personal action against an employee 
. . . [for whistle blower activities] . . . unless: 
(a) . . . the employee has allowed the employer 
sufficient time to take appropriate corrective action; 
or (b) the employee has not conformed to reasonable 
procedures administratively established by the employer 
for reporting such matters to the appropriate 
administrators.7 
The City submits that Section 67-21-3 of the Act reflects a 
policy that the government employee should give the elected 
7Section 67-21-3 of the Utah Code Annotated, emphasis added. 
4 
officials the opportunity, through its processes, to discover and 
correct personnel errors. Elected officials cannot be involved 
in each personnel decision made daily by subordinate managers. 
The Civil Service process is the "reasonable procedure" 
administratively established by law, for elected officials, to 
review and correct erroneous personnel decisions. A public 
employee should conform to these reasonable administrative 
procedures. 
The City submits that the Court of Appeals' failure to make 
any reference to Section 67-21-3 of the Act warrants further 
review by this Court. 
POINT III 
HATTON-WARD CONTINUES TO MAKE FACTUAL 
ALLEGATIONS WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO THE 
RECORD. 
The City reasserts its objections to Hatton-Ward's disregard 
of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In his 
response, Hatton-Ward continues to make factual allegations 
without any citations to the record. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari and this Reply Brief, the City respectfully submits 
that the decision of the Court of Appeals warrants review by this 
Court. 
DATED this 3-0 day of M/iM , 199 2 jtM 
FRANK M. Ni 
Assistant City Attofney 
Attorney for Appellees 
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